Fraud Auditing, Detection, & Prevention Blog

Fraud Risk Assessment: A New Model and a New Approach

Written by Leonard W. Vona | Nov 19, 2026, 4:45:14 PM

In this blog, I want you to think about two basic concepts in the traditional fraud risk assessment process: inherent fraud risk and the monetary impact of fraud when internal controls are not sufficient to mitigate the fraud risk.

I know these concepts sound good, but do they truly work? Like anything, sometimes yes and sometimes no. It is the “sometimes no” that worries me.

Internet Research: Inherent Fraud Risk

To ground our discussion, here are the traditional definitions:

  • Inherent risk: the susceptibility of an account balance or assertion to misstatement, irrespective of controls. SAS 145 requires the separate assessment of inherent risk and control risk, both of which feed into the risk of material misstatement (RMM).
  • Control risk: the probability that a company’s internal control system will fail to prevent, detect, or correct a material misstatement or fraud in financial reporting.
  • Inherent fraud risk: the natural susceptibility of a transaction, account balance, or business process to material misstatement or deceitful practices before considering any internal controls or safeguards.

Inherent Fraud Risk Assessment: Does It Make Sense?

I do not think inherent fraud risk assessment makes sense, for many reasons. It is generally accepted that the purpose of internal controls is to minimize the potential for an error, intentional or not, to occur. Logically, then, the absence of an internal control would mean the likelihood of an error is high. So please tell me the purpose or value of inherent risk assessment as it relates to fraud risk.

I believe we should substitute control risk for inherent risk. My definition of control risk is: the probability that a company’s internal control system will fail to prevent, detect, or deter a fraud risk statement from occurring in a core business system. Please see my August 2026 blog.

Let’s look at a real-life fraud scheme: the ghost employee.

My blog about ghost employees is one of my most-read posts. Take the fast-food industry; we have all eaten at one of the many chains. No matter what you tell me, the manager is the key control in preventing ghost employee schemes. But if the manager decides to commit one of these schemes, the likelihood must be rated as high. There is no logical way to prevent it.

In this example, how does the inherent fraud risk assessment process help the fraud risk process? We know the answer before we ask the question.

Assessing Impact: Does It Make Sense?

I do not think we can realistically determine the impact when a fraud risk statement occurs in your core business. To determine the impact, we would need to evaluate the probability of each fraud risk occurring and then measure its operational and reputational damage using qualitative and quantitative metrics.

Using the ghost employee scheme, I think we could all agree that if a manager at a fast-food restaurant ran a ghost employee scheme, the fiscal impact on the corporation would be negligible. The traditional residual risk score would be low. That is not because of likelihood. It is because of the perceived money lost to the scheme.

Now let me give you a different set of facts. Back to the fast-food restaurant: what if the manager was using the payroll payments to a ghost employee in exchange for sexual services? Now what is the impact?

Let me change the impact again. Last month I discussed financial crimes. Forget the fast-food company for a minute. What if the ghost employee scheme occurred in a foreign subsidiary and was actually a bribe payment? Now you have an FCPA issue.

There are really two issues in determining impact. First, how does one assess the likelihood that someone would commit the overt act associated with the impact statement? In my examples, those acts were theft of money, a bribe to a foreign official, and payment for sexual services. Second, if the person commits an overt act, how do you calculate the financial, operational, or reputational damage?

As a profession, we must ask: Is it really possible to determine the fiscal impact when a fraud scheme occurs? Or is this simply an academic exercise?

Leonard’s Thoughts for the New Model and the New Approach

  • Recognize the difference between fraud that results in misstated financial statements and asset misappropriation, corruption, financial crimes, and so on.
  • Stay focused on our strengths. First, evaluate the adequacy of the design of the internal controls, then determine their operating effectiveness.
  • Understand that a high risk score is not necessarily bad. It is simply knowledge.
  • Forget assessing the financial impact. It is a silly academic exercise because it is not based on supportable evidence. There are simply too many variables and assumptions.
  • Treat the evaluation process as a way to learn how best to manage the fraud risk, not as a way to achieve a low residual risk score.
  • Advise management on internal control alternatives: fraud deterrence,fraud detection, or fraud prevention controls.

Fraud Trivia

1. What is corporate crime sociology?
The study of illegal and harmful acts committed by business organizations, or by individuals acting on their behalf, to benefit the company.

2. Who are sociologists Clinard and Yeager?
Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Yeager (with Ruth Blackburn Clinard) wrote Corporate Crime, a landmark 1980 book. It provides a comprehensive empirical study of unlawful behavior and regulatory violations by America’s largest corporations.

3. Much like the ACFE Fraud Tree, what are Clinard and Yeager’s categories of corporate crime?

  • Financial offenses: tax evasion, illegal accounting fraud, and hiding massive corporate debts.
  • Environmental (green) crimes: illegal dumping, toxic pollution, and severe ecological damage.
  • Labor law violations: ignoring workplace safety rules, exposing workers to severe hazards, or paying sub-minimum wages.
  • Unfair trade practices: price-fixing, monopolistic control, and false advertising.
  • Manufacturing offenses: selling mislabeled, substandard, or dangerous products to consumers.

4. Can you provide some real-life examples of corporate crimes?

  • Enron (2001): Executives used fake accounting methods and special entities to hide billions in debt and inflate profits, leading to bankruptcy and the loss of thousands of jobs.
  • Volkswagen “Dieselgate” (2015): The carmaker installed secret software in diesel vehicles to cheat on federal emissions tests, falsely meeting clean-air standards while polluting heavily.
  • Theranos (2018): Top executives lied to investors, doctors, and patients about the actual capabilities of their blood-testing technology, leading to criminal fraud convictions.
  • BP oil spill (2010): Gross negligence and safety shortcuts in offshore drilling led to the Deepwater Horizon explosion, causing massive environmental and economic damage.

5. Does your corporate fraud risk assessment identify and assess these risks?
Only you can answer this question.

Test Your Knowledge: Marshall B. Clinard

CFEs like to talk about Cressey and the Fraud Triangle, but what do you know about Marshall B. Clinard?

1. What was his first degree?
2. What was his second degree?
3. What was his true field of study?
4. What book did he write that is now in its fifteenth edition?
5. At which university did he complete his PhD dissertation?